Issues of persistence through time have been controversial in recent scholarship. A popular new view is four-dimensionalism: the view that time is a dimension much like space. Although it has been motivated in part by advancements in special relativity, four-dimensionalism has primarily emerged as a solution to recent metaphysical dilemmas. In this paper, I will examine three solutions to David Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics. I then find that the four-dimensionalist view of perdurantism solves the problem of temporary intrinsics while managing to avoid the serious problems that the other two views encounter. I agree with Lewis that it is the best view of the three. I will then show that this view in light of problems related to composition, nominalist perdurantism best explains our experience of objects.
How to Cite:
Thornburg, K., 2010. The Perdurantist’s Commitments. International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities, 2(2), pp.4 (22–28).