Author:

Abstract

Contemporary philosophy discussions on the nature of time begin with McTaggart, who introduces two ways of describing temporal relation between events: the A-series, focusing on the past, present and future, is about positions of time; and the B-series, which an event’s position in the series is described only in relation to other events: “earlier than,” “later than,” or “simultaneous with.” Along with McTaggart’s objection to the reality of time, I provide a detailed exposition of why change can be expressed within the A-series and why the A-series contains a contradiction. In addition, I demonstrate step by step that time does not flow from one moment to the next in the “B-series” of time. I expound upon the concept to sketch the objective and subjective time perceptions from Kant’s logical perspectives. Then, by identifying objective and subjective temporal concept types, based on Smart’s and Sartre’s arguments regarding the incapability of applying physical reductionism on time and the absence of passage in human definitions of time, I argue for a new approach in contemporary discussions on the predominantly subjective nature of time.